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attention again to the point already alluded to, which exhibits, most clearly and briefly, the difference between Berkeley and Hegel. It is this:—Berkeley held that there is nothing whatever existing above our hemisphere of knowledge except Spirits and Phenomena; that all our objects and all our Universe, material and immaterial, consist of one or the other of these two natures; that we cannot even imagine anything of any third nature, but that we have distinctly these two totally different natures among the facts of consciousness. Hegel, on the contrary, says, No. Among the facts of consciousness we have nothing but Phenomena; there is no such thing as a Spirit or Ego, no Percipient, no Person, nothing except that action or process which we call a Phenomenon, a Thinking, or a Thought. Thus Hegel holds the whole of Berkeley's doctrine on the Nature of Matter, but only one-half of Berkeley's whole doctrine, which involves Spirits as well as Phenomena. The more important half, the earnest Hegel imitates the jeering Hume in throwing overboard. He who holds, as Hegel did, that there is nothing to be called "Spirit" but the Phenomenal, i. e. Thought, and that Matter is of that nature also, holds, *however little he may have intended to do so*, that the Spirit is of the same nature as matter—that the Spirit is material—that Matter thinks. This is Materialism, as Hume well knew; but it is not Metaphysics. And as to the Principles of the Greek Philosophy and Hegel's Bond of Being derived from them, these have their rational application in Berkeley's doctrine, not in this Identity (*Einerleiheit*) of that which thinks and of that which does not.

HEGEL'S FIRST PRINCIPLE.

(As Introduction to the Translation of the "*Science of the Comprehension.*")

It has been asserted so often by English writers that Hegel is a Pantheist, or "*Panlogist*," and that he holds that all is a relation, or that all is Pure Being (we cannot enumerate here all the absurd notions placed to his account) that no small degree of interest should attach to his own statement of his First Principle. In these outlines of the Science of the Comprehension—which are translated from the

third year's course of the Propædæutics—he concisely unfolds what he defines as “the In-and-for-itself-existent, the simple totality, creator of all its determinations.” Those who think the terms “concept” or “notion” would answer as English equivalents for the Hegelian “Begriff,” are invited to consider the eighty-eighth paragraph (§ 88) of the “Outlines of Hegel's Logic,” published on page 278 of this volume, as well as the second paragraph (§ 2) of the present exposition.

The exposition of that which is “In-and-for-itself-existent” is not the exposition of “a notion.” The First Principle, seized in its immediateness, i. e. in its most inadequate forms—superficially—is taken as subjective process of thought, concept, judgment, syllogism. But each of these is seized as an adumbration of the True Principle, which is called “Idea.” The region of thought in which the “Science of the Comprehension” starts must be gained by traversing the provinces of the “Objective Logic,” which includes the “Science of Being” and the “Science of Essence,” i. e. Ontology and Ætiology (or “Statical and Dynamical,” as called by C. C. Everett in his treatise on the “Science of Thought”). This preliminary work may be done by mastering the exposition, already referred to, commencing on page 257 of this volume. But in order to connect that exposition more closely with the one here translated, we give a brief survey of the field occupied by Philosophic Thought as a whole, and a more detailed examination of the *Prima Philosophia*, or Science of Science—called Logic by Hegel:

THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy is a closed circle, ending in its beginning; hence no one can begin his system anywhere without making some sort of a presupposition. But Philosophy, as absolute science, should have no presupposition; hence any system can become absolute science only as it completes itself to a circle, and thereby supplies the presupposition made in the beginning. Moreover, in a circle a beginning may be made anywhere; one would expect, therefore, a multitude of beginnings, according to the caprice of the philosopher. And again, since all arbitrariness—not being adequate to Freedom—produces only what is subordinate to law, these manifold beginnings can be reduced and explained, and their necessary limits drawn.

Thus all beginnings may be reduced to three: Subjective, objective, and absolute.*

The *subjective* beginning is the starting-point of subjective culture, the beginning which conscious being makes in its first act of knowl-

* See “System der Wissenschaft,” by Karl Rosenkranz (p. 12), for an excellent statement of the Hegelian doctrine on this point.

edge. It starts with the Here and Now, a world of alien objective existences or appearances, and proceeds to prove them and test their validity. The end of its labor is the elevation of itself to a knowledge of a fixed, permanent principle, which is adequate to the explanation of the objective world. This beginning presupposes a subjective world, and an objective world opposed to it. The result of the procedure carried out fully, explains the origin of this antithesis of subject and object with which it started. This science is the Phenomenology of Mind.

The *objective* beginning starts with Being in general, and seeks to find the adequate and true form of objective existence, or what is the true actuality. While the subjective side in the Phenomenology sought to elevate itself to the knowledge of the True, this procedure (beginning with Being) seeks to elevate the Objective to a true existence, and is called Logic by Hegel, but by most others since Aristotle "Metaphysics," although by Aristotle and some others *Πρώτη Φιλοσοφία* (*Prima Philosophia*). The result of the procedure carried out fully is the comprehension of the Absolute. The first principle, which is efficient and also final cause of all, the immanent cause or *causa sui*, is God.

The *absolute* beginning, accordingly, is the *Idea*, as Hegel calls it: the absolute self-conscious Reason, which is the identity of the theoretical and practical, of knowing and being. The procedure made from this beginning is the systematic exposition of the world of Nature and Spirit, as manifestation, realization, and actualization of God, or absolute self-conscious Reason. The presupposition made by this beginning is manifestly the establishment of the Idea as the highest and true form of Being—the result of the Logic. Logic had for presupposition the already existent power, on the part of the thinker, to *comprehend*, i. e. to think speculatively or exhaustively—*sub specie æternitatis percipere*—the power to apply the test of Universality (self-relation) to any category.

It is clear that the third beginning—the absolute first principle—must be present as the moving soul in all philosophical procedure. In the Phenomenology, this is the ideal that hovers before the inadequate forms of knowing and exhibits their incompleteness and self-contradiction. In the Logic, this is again the ideal totality, which the inadequate categories are unable to express; in their attempt to do this they demand the aid of their opposites, and thus struggle dialectically toward the concrete *self-definition* of the Idea.

The substance of the science (*Prima Philosophia*) by which one arrives at the Comprehension as the True, may be given compendiously as follows, starting at the Second Beginning here mentioned :

LOGIC.

I.—*Being.*

(A.) If we seize the objective world *immediately* (without mediation), we seize it as *Being*. All categories of Being have this in common, that they are seized as possessing immediate truth, and not as obtaining truth through relation to another. Thus it is with *Quality*, *Quantity*, and *Mode*, or the determinations classified under them.

A short examination will test their claims to this immediate truth :

(B.) Take, then, the simple Immediate; admit no mediation into it, whether in the definition or in the "meaning" which we attach to it. Being shall be simple and self-sufficing, the pure and undetermined One :

1. In this simplicity, therefore, it neither has nor can have any determination.

2. But that which is utterly devoid of determination is likewise devoid of *relation*, and hence of self-relation, and hence neither exists for itself nor for another.

3. Hence the simple immediate is an absolute nullity.

(C.) Thus the categories of Being prove their inadequacy to express reality. The stage of consciousness which supposed that it possessed adequate knowledge through such categories would be *naïve* and self-deceived. (The sensuous consciousness is that stage in the Phenomenology, wherein the Ego makes the experience that all in Time and Space is mediated, composite, and therefore cannot be known adequately except by mediated knowing.)

II.—*Negativity.*

The dialectic of Being results in the negation of Being as having independence.

(A.) Hence we have the Negative for the universal result; the Immediate is the Negative.

The dialectic of the Negative.

1. Negativity is here the Universal or the All (since all is proved to be mediated); the negative is essentially a relative.

2. But since the All is the Negative, this Negative can subsist only as self-relative, or a negative of itself.

3. But a self-negative is a self-cancelling, and hence the opposite of itself while it is itself.

This gives us the category of *Appearance* or the *Phenomenal*—that which is self-nugatory.

(B.) Pure mediation is therefore pure relation, the world of the *Understanding*, a world of enchantment. All the antithetical (*reflexive*)

determinations, such as *positive* and *negative*, *thing* and *properties*, *force* and *manifestation*, occur here.

Pure mediation has truth as opposed to Being. But is it adequate to express true actuality?

1. In pure mediation we have the negative related to itself, hence, the following dualism:

(a) The Negative related to itself is *a going of the same to the same* and hence *Identity*.

(b) But at the same time, since it is a *negative* relation, it cancels that to which it relates, and hence *itself*, and thus it repels itself from itself, is pure self-opposition or self-distinction.

(c) Thus Identity and Distinction are the result of the same activity of the negative.

2. With this, Pure negativity or pure relativity finds again the repose of Being. In fact, all Being is now seen to be simply the *phase* of identity which occurs in this dual process of the self-relation of the negative. All becoming and transition in Being was merely the result of our seizing it too narrowly and including only the *self-relative* phase, or that of identity, and then being compelled to notice the *negative* self-relation or cancelling of identity. This transpires eternally as the internal nature of all that we call Beings, meaning thereby immediate existences, individual things, qualities, quantities, and modes. These are all mere phases—fragments or parts of the Totality, dependent upon and conditioned by the Totality. Each Being finds its limits in others, and these in it. So that the part has no being except *in* its relation to others and *through* their relation to it. Being is therefore a small segment of the Total, and in considering the dialectic of Relativity or Negativity we have found what and how Being is.

3. Thus we have a positive result. Our Whole or total process is a self-determining one, and the three moments of Identity, Distinction, and their Unity, may now be recognized as the triune process of subject-objectivity, i. e. Egohood—consciousness. Our substance—our permanent unity—is not a rigid, lifeless one, but a Personal Subject.

(C.) If objectivity in its first immediateness is called Being, then we have considered what its presuppositions are; at once finding that it must necessarily depend upon its relations for its entire subsistence. Thus we traced objectivity into the form of duality, i. e. *relation*—and this form we find possible only as self-relation when we seize it as a whole. We are now prepared to say: "Only the self-determined exists; all else is mere dependent fragment or phase of it, and merely *seems*—it does not exist, it depends." What this self-determined Being is, must be considered:

1. As self-related *Negative*, it is the Universal, the Generic, the Simple; it is the undetermined possibility of all.

2. But since this Negation *relates to itself*, its activity determines it; the very nature of the Generic *creates*; hence arises the Particular, the diremption, scission, or internal division produced through self-opposition.

3. But the Generic and its specializing are one unity—the Individual. That which *actually* exists is neither the pure Generic—which thus isolated would be the pure nought—nor the particularizations which are the results of the negative activity of the former, *but the active process itself as Individual Ego*—the complete negativity which elevates the individual out of any determination, restraint, or limit, so that he is always Universal, i. e. the possibility of self-contemplation. I can always, in whatever I am doing, drop at once the object of my contemplation and take up another, or make the empty form of subject the object, by thinking of the pure Ego. No NATURAL Being could do this, for the reason that whatever has essential relations to the Without, and depends upon other Beings, is not Whole and has no Self. Its negativity is not, self-related *within it*, but *without (outside) it*. Were the stone conscious, it would know itself as almost utterly outside itself, or rather its knowing would necessarily be outside of it, i. e. in the Rational being who looks upon it. “Almost utterly,” we said, because if *utterly*, then the stone would melt into the pure space which it occupies. It therefore *does* take a step towards knowing itself; it *falls* towards the centre of the planet—a dumb confession that its Being lies outside of it in the centre of the planet.

One is liable to fall into error here unless he is careful to comprehend fully the essential point, to-wit: that the individual is no process in the sense that it is “thinking without a thinker.” It is ἐνέργεια (or νοήσις) *not as an abstract concept*, but ἡ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ, *not ideas or activities in the abstract*—as if one should say that the concept or archetype of a table or house is indestructible, and outlasts all tables or houses, or as if one should say that the ultimate truth is the CORRELATION OF FORCES, a perpetual circular movement, the eternal passage of FORCE through a series of phases, now electricity, now heat, now attraction, &c. In these cases no SUBJECT in a proper sense is stated or thought by those who hold such doctrines. In the self-relation (ἡ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ) the monad is stated—“atomic subjectivity”—which, however, finds its truth in Personality, or the “Pre-established Harmony”—not a harmony forced upon the monad, but a harmony into which he ascends by his own activity, dissolving the objective, and widening his subjectivity until the *atomic* becomes COSMIC. Is Goethe or Shakespeare more or less of a person than the semi-cultured man who fears to study those authors too much lest he “lose his personality”? Is not rather the man of most personality he who has broken in most

ways the narrow limits of his natural individuality and has given himself up heart and soul to the greatest geniuses, borrowing negative force from each to cancel his own finitude? All this movement in the form of self-relation is the achievement of conscious Selfhood.

But Hegel's greatest merit lies in this: that he does not stop at this point of Platonic idealism, high though it be. He seizes it in its history—as Aristotle did in his time—and rises to the standpoint of the “Idea,” as he calls it—not merely the monad with its self-relation and a pre-established harmony or an abstract world-order, but a concrete realization of all this. He finds the system of freedom, **RATIONAL FREEDOM**, to be the Substantial World. Not the *Système du Monde* of Laplace, with its blind forces, but a system of the World which is exhibited as plastic to the Divine Reason. Mechanical and Dynamical to matter and finite relations, this immanent principle is the Ideal or Final Cause to the conscious Being. As Dante expresses it:

Ed è NATURA

Ch' al sommo pinga noi di collo in collo.

Or, as the *Chorus Mysticus* in Faust names it:

Das EWIGE WEIBLICHE zieht uns hinan.

God as self-conscious Reason: (1) Separating Himself from Himself in the act of knowing Himself as *object*, thereby creating all forms of chaos and the chaotic; (2) in the recognition of Himself as object, annulling the chaos and chaotic, creating the rising spiral of Nature, and resting from creation with the contemplation of His **IMAGE** = self-conscious intelligence in man. The Idea is the Comprehension of Comprehensions, the Truth as the form of the Absolute Actuality = the Self-conscious Divine Reason.*

THE SCIENCE OF THE COMPREHENSION.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

§ 1. Objective Logic is the science of the Comprehension *in itself*, or the science of the Categories. Subjective Logic, which we treat of here, is the science of the Comprehension *as* Comprehension, or of the Comprehension of somewhat. It is divided into three parts:

- (1) The science of the Comprehension;
- (2) The science of its Realization;
- (3) The science of the Idea.

* See Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 20 & 21, and also pp. 236 to 240.

First Division.

SCIENCE OF THE COMPREHENSION.

I.—Comprehension.

§ 2. The Comprehension is the Universal, which is at the same time determined; that which remains in its determination the same Whole or Universal; or it is the determinateness which comprehends—grasps together—in itself the different determinations of an object as unity.

Note by Translator.—By the Objective Logic we have arrived at the Adequate form of True Being, and this is the self-determined—*causa sui*. Now we come to consider it; and we find it as the process of subsumption of itself under itself. At first this is merely *formal*, for the reason that it subsumes itself only fragmentarily under its Infinite form. Gradually, however, it comes to subsume itself as a Totality, and when it reaches this goal it is the *IDEA*.

The Comprehension is the “adequate form of True Being,” i. e. it is a *TOTALITY*, and this must be kept in mind constantly in order to understand the dialectical movement in the Judgment and Syllogism.

§ 3. The moments of the Comprehension are Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. It is their unity.

§ 4. The Universal is this unity as positive, self-identical, undetermined unity; the Particular is the determination of the Universal, but such a one as is cancelled [or reduced to a moment] in the Universal, i. e. the Universal remains in it what it is; the Individual is the negative unity, or the determination which forms a unity with itself through self-determination.

§ 5. The Universal includes *under it* the Particular and Individual; so likewise the Particular includes under it the Individual; on the contrary, the Individual includes *in it* the Particular and the Universal, and the Particular includes *in it* the Universal. The Universal is more *extensive* than the Particular or Individual, but the latter are more *comprehensive* than the former, which for the reason that it is included in the Individual is a determinateness of it. The Universal *inheres in* the Particular and Individual, while the latter are *subsumed under* the former.

§ 6. Since the Comprehension contains in itself the moments of Individuality, Particularity, and Universality, it is manifoldly determined with regard to its content, and is the comprehension of something Individual, Particular, or Universal.

§ 7. The particularizations of the Universal, i. e. determina-

tions which have one and the same common sphere, these and likewise the individuals which are subsumed under the same Particular or Universal, are said to be COÖRDINATE; what is subsumed is also said to be SUBORDINATE to that under which it is subsumed.

§ 8. The coördinated particular determinations of the Universal are opposed to each other, and, in case the one is to be taken as the negation of the other, they are CONTRADICTORY; but whenever the other also has positiveness and through this falls within the same general sphere as the former, they are opposed merely as CONTRARIES. Such determinations, coördinated in the Universal, cannot co-exist in the Individual; but those which are coördinated in the Individual are [merely] DIFFERENT ones [i. e. disparate], i. e. they do not have the same universal sphere in their distinction, but are in harmony (accord) with the Individual.

§ 9. The coördinate determinations of the Universal, considered more in detail, are: (1) the one the negative of the other in general, without regard to the question whether they have the same universal sphere or not; (2) in so far as they have the same sphere in common, and the one determination is positive, the other negative, so that this negativity toward each other constitutes their nature, they are properly termed *contradictories*; (3) in so far as they stand in opposition in the same common sphere, or the one is positive in the same sense as the other, and each consequently can be called positive as well as negative in relation to the other, they are *contraries*.

§ 10. With the determination of Contrariety, which is indifferent as regards the antithesis of positive and negative, the transition is effected into the Being determined-in-and-for-itself and out of the determinateness-through-others, and by this the mutual participation of the same sphere is differentiated and becomes individuality, whose determinations differ from each other without a common sphere and are thereby determined in and for themselves.

II.—Judgment.

§ 11. The Judgment is the presentation of an object as unfolded into the three moments of the Comprehension. It contains it: (a) in the determination of individuality as *subject*;

(b) in its determination of universality or its *predicate*, by which means the subject can also stand in relation to the predicate itself as individuality to particularity and as particularity to universality; (c) the simple *relation* of the predicate to the subject, without content—the IS, the *copula*.

§ 12. The Judgment is to be distinguished from the Proposition: in the latter something quite individual—an occurrence—is expressed of a subject, or, as in general propositions, something is affirmed of the subject as having a necessary connection with it, and which it becomes or to which it stands in opposition. Since in the Comprehension the moments are seized as in one unity, in the Judgment also (as presenting the Comprehension), although there is determination, there is no Becoming or antithesis. The inferior determination—the subject—elevates itself to the Universal, which differs from it, i. e. to the predicate; or *is* it immediately.

§ 13. In Logic the Judgment is considered according to its pure form without regard to any definite empirical content. Judgments are classified by the relation in which the subject and predicate stand to each other—in how far their relation is through and in the Comprehension, or is a relation of objectivity to the Comprehension. Upon the character of this relation depends the higher or absolute truth of the Judgment. Truth is the harmony of the Comprehension with its objectivity. In the Judgment this presentation of the Comprehension and its objectivity begins, and hence the sphere of Truth begins here.

§ 14. Inasmuch as the Judgment is the presentation of an object in the different moments of the Comprehension, it is moreover the exhibition of the Comprehension in its determinate Being, not so much because of the definite content which the moments of the Comprehension have, as because in the Judgment these latter issue forth from their (implicit) unity. As the entire judgment exhibits the Comprehension in its determinate Being, so this distinction comes again into the form of the Judgment itself. The subject is the object, and the predicate is the generality of the same which is intended to express it as Comprehension. The movement of the Judgment through its different species elevates this universality (generality) to a higher stage, wherein it comes to correspond as nearly to

the Comprehension as is possible for it in so far as it is a mere predicate.

A.—Quality of Judgments, or the Judgment of Inherence.

§ 15. The predicate in the most elementary form of the Judgment (*unmittelbar*) is a property which belongs to the subject in such a manner, that, although it stands in relation to it as universal in general, yet at the same time it is only the particular existence of it, which as such has several determinatenesses. Universality, the predicate, has here the meaning only of an immediate (or sensuous) universality—a mere possessing in common with others.

§ 16. In the qualitative Judgment the predicate is just as well something universal, which side constitutes the form of the Judgment, as a determined quality of the subject which manifests itself as content. According to the former side, the Judgment takes as its pure form: "*the individual is a universal*"; according to the latter, the side of content: "*the individual is thus and so determined*";—and this is the *positive* judgment in general. ("This is good"; "This is bad"; "This rose is red"; "This rose is white," &c.)

§ 17. For the reason that (1) the individual is just as well *not* universal, and (2) the subject has other determinations besides *this one*, the qualitative judgment must be expressed negatively in both respects; hence arises the *negative judgment*. ("This is not good"; "This is not bad"; "This rose is not red, but white"—yellow, &c.; "This rose is not white, but red," &c.)

§ 18. According to form, therefore, this judgment is: "*The individual is not a universal but a particular*"; according to content: "*The individual is not thus, but otherwise determined.*" In both respects this negative judgment is at the same time also positive. In the first respect, the negation is only the limitation of the Universality to the particularity; in the other respect, only some one determinateness is negated, and through this negation the Universality or the higher sphere makes its appearance.

§ 19. Finally: (1) *According to form*, the individual is not a mere particular somewhat—for particularity is more exten-

sive than individuality—but the individual is only the individual; and this is the *Identical judgment*.

Conversely: (2) *According to content*, the subject is not only not this particular determinateness, but also not any other determinateness merely. Such a content is too narrow for the subject. Through this negation of determinateness is cancelled the entire sphere of the predicate and the positive relation which subsisted in the preceding negative judgment; and this gives the *Infinite judgment*.

§ 20. The mentioned *identical* and *infinite* judgments are no proper judgments. That is to say, the mutual relation which subsists between the subject and predicate in the Qualitative Judgment is cancelled, which relation was this: that there was expressed only some one of the immediate determinatenesses of its Being—a determinateness to which belonged only a superficial generality. In the infinite judgment, a universality is demanded which is not a mere individual determinateness. The mentioned identical judgment signifies that the subject is determined for and by itself, and is in its determination returned into itself [i. e. is completely exhausted by the predicate].

§ 21. In the identical and infinite judgments the mutual relation of subject and predicate is cancelled. This is to be taken first as that side of the judgment according to which subject and predicate can be regarded as standing through the copula in a relation of identity, abstracting from their difference. In this respect the positive judgment can become inverted in so far as the predicate is taken only in the same extent of significance as the subject is.

§ 22. The negative judgment contains the separation of a determinateness from its subject in such a manner that the subject is still related positively to the universal (though not expressly stated) sphere of the determinateness. Whenever the negated predicate is made the subject, the universal sphere mentioned falls away, and leaves only the non-identity of two determinatenesses in general, and it is indifferent which of them is made subject or which predicate. The negative judgment can therefore (and so also the identical judgment) be inverted without altering it.

Note by Translator.—The qualitative Judgment deals with the Finite—the sphere where the Individual is not a Totality, and where the Universal is only a Common

or General, and the Particular some determinateness coördinate with or antithetic to some other. Hence arises its *dialectic*. It attempts to express its content, but says too much; there is untruth in the content, and untruth again in the form of expression. Hegel traces out, §§ 15-22, the course of the ascending series of judgments, pointing out the defects in form and content separately, and at the same time shows their incongruity with each other. These defects and incongruities may be seen readily by any one who will consider that the equality of subject and predicate expressed by the copula IS can only exist in the case where each is the Total Comprehension (i. e. universal as regards extension and "comprehension"). Hence the identical judgment is the true form, and the content falls into the infinite judgment. "A red rose is a red rose" as identical judgment, though true in form expresses nothing, but merely implies that its content is self-determined. "The rose is not an elephant," as infinite judgment, likewise expresses nothing, since all relation is denied between the subject and predicate, and not any implied even, as there is in the case of the negative judgment, "The rose is not red, but white," &c. Every sensuous quality is inadequate as predicate to a Totality: it falls both in *extent* and in *comprehension*. This is the positive import of the infinite judgment. With the identical judgment, a "point of indifference" has been reached, and inversion can take place. The form of *reflection-into-itself* is reached.

B.—Quantity of Judgments, or Judgments of Reflection.

§ 23. Where judgments can be inverted, the distinction of subject and predicate is ignored. This distinction is however, since it is now cancelled as qualitative, to be taken quantitatively.

§ 24. Since the individual determinatenesses which the predicate contained cancel themselves, the predicate has to include the manifold determinations of the subject taken together. Through this circumstance the universality ceases to be a mere community with others. It is the universality which belongs to the subject's own nature, which consequently implies that the subject returns into itself in [is exhausted by] its predicate.

§ 25. Such a judgment is consequently a judgment of *Reflection*, since *Reflection* implies the going through several determinations of an object and the grasping together of the same in unity.

§ 26. In so far as the identity of the subject with the predicate makes its appearance, the subject is a Universal which is subject through confining it to individuality. The quantitative judgment is therefore (1) a singular somewhat which has in the determination of subject perfect individuality and is a **THIS** Universal.

§ 27. A **THIS** is determined in infinitely manifold ways, i. e. it is indefinitely determinable. The predicate of Reflection,

since it is a complex, expresses not only the general determination of *one* This, but also of *other* This's; that is to say, the singular judgment goes over (2) into the Particular.

§ 28. The particular judgment in which the subject is determined as "some" is only a determined judgment, which can be expressed immediately just as well positively as negatively.

§ 29. The subject receives its perfect determination, according to extent of form, (3) through the "All-ness" in the universal judgment. Since the "All-ness" enters in place of particularity, and has at the same time the extent of the latter, the extent of the content of the subject must be limited according to it.

§ 30. The subject becomes partly through this a particular as regards its predicate, partly there enters a relation of necessity between subject and predicate.

Note by Translator. — Judgments of reflection, therefore, are (1) the Singular: "This man is mortal"; (2) the Particular: "Some men are mortal"; (3) the Universal: "All men are mortal." They ascend from the Individual to the Universal, and the latter rest upon the perceived *necessity* in the relation of subject and predicate.

C.—Relation of Judgments, or Judgments of Necessity.

§ 31. Through the cancelling of the qualitative and quantitative determinations, the unity of content of subject and predicate is posited, which latter therefore differ only through their form, so that the same object is posited at one time merely as subject; at another, as predicate.

§ 32. Since the subject is a particular somewhat as opposed to its predicate, conversely the subject is now in contradistinction to the qualitative judgment a determinateness of the predicate and immediately subsumed under the same. The universality of the predicate expresses, therefore, not merely a complex of determinatenesses of the subject like the predicate of Reflection, but the universal internal nature of the subject; and this is the *Categorical* judgment. ("The body is heavy." "Gold is a metal." "Mind is rational.")

§ 33. In so far as subject and predicate are also distinct, their unity also must be expressed as *unity of contraries*, i. e. as necessary relation; and this is the *hypothetical judgment*.

§ 34. The Identity of content (which is found in the categorical judgment) and the Relation of contraries (in the hypo-

thetical judgment) are united in the *disjunctive judgment*, wherein the subject is a universal sphere or is considered in regard to such a one, and this (universal sphere) constitutes the predicate; and the particularization or various determinations of the predicate express this. Of these, the one as well as the other belongs to the universal. According to their particularization and in respect to the subject, however, they exclude each other.

D.—Modality of Judgments, or Judgments of the Relation of the Comprehension to Being.

§ 35. In the disjunctive judgment, a Being is posited in the complete series of moments of the Comprehension. Modality of judgments consists in this, that a Being is related to its comprehension as such, and the predicate expresses the conformity or non-conformity of the two.

§ 36. The first judgment of modality is the *assertorical*, which contains a mere assertion, inasmuch as only the *state* or *condition* of the subject which is to be compared with the comprehension, and not the comprehension itself is expressed; hence this judgment has at first only a subjective confirmation. (“This deed is bad”; “This remark is true.”)

§ 37. Against the assurances of assertorical judgments, therefore, the opposite may just as well be asserted; the predicate expresses only one of those opposite determinatenesses of which the subject, considered as universal sphere, contains both. This judgment, therefore, passes over into the *problematical*, which expresses merely the *possibility* of the conformity or non-conformity of the given existence to the Comprehension.

§ 38. The universality of the subject is therefore posited with a limitation which expresses the state or condition in which lies the conformity or non-conformity of the given existence with the Comprehension. The predicate expresses nothing else than this identity or non-identity of the state or condition with the Comprehension of the object. This is the *APODEICTIC* judgment.

Note by Translator.—The correspondence of the classification of judgments with the divisions of the Objective Logic is manifest. Qualitative judgments express the perceptions of immediateness or Being; judgments of Reflection and Necessity express perceptions of mediation in its three aspects, (a) as Essence, (b) as

Phenomenon, (c) as Actuality; judgments of Modality express perceptions of absolute mediation or of the Comprehension.

A general survey of the classification of Judgments is here given. (See P. VI. Vol. III. Hegel's Great Logic, 2d Ed.)

A. Judgments of Being:

- a. The positive judgment;
- b. The negative judgment;
- c. The infinite judgment.

B. Judgments of Reflection:

- a. The singular judgment;
- b. The particular Judgment;
- c. The universal judgment.

C. Judgments of Necessity:

- a. The categorical judgment;
- b. The hypothetical judgment;
- c. The disjunctive judgment.

D. Judgments of the Comprehension:

- a. The assertorical judgment;
- b. The problematical judgment;
- c. The apodeictic judgment.

III.—*Syllogism.*

§ 39. The syllogism is the perfect exhibition of the Comprehension. It contains, as such, *the judgment with its ground*. There are in it two determinations which are united by means of a third which is their unity. It is a comprehension extant as unity (the middle term of the syllogism) and as diremption (the extremes of the syllogism).

§ 40. The relation of the two extremes of the syllogism to the middle term is an immediate one; their relation to each other, however, is mediated through the middle term. The former, the two immediate relations, are the judgments which are called *premises*; the relation which is mediated is called the *conclusion*.

§ 41. In the first place, the syllogism expresses its moments through the mere *form*, in such a manner that the middle term is a peculiar determinateness as opposed to the extremes, and the ground or unity of the moments is a mere *subjective* one. That which is really the primitive is in this case a deduced, and has the signification of a result.

A.—Syllogisms of Quality or of Inherence.

§ 42. The form of this syllogism I—P—U (Individual—Particular—Universal)—that the Individual is connected with the Universal through the Particular, is the general rule of the

sylogism as such. In the first, immediate, syllogism, the Particular or the middle term is *a quality* or determinateness of the Individual, and, likewise, the Universal is a determinateness of the Particular. Therefore a transition might be made from the Individual through another one of its determinations (of which it has several) to *another universal*; and so likewise from the Particular to another Universal, since the Particular also contains within itself different determinations. This syllogism appears to be correct so far as its form is concerned, but according to its content arbitrary and contingent. ("Green is a pleasant color; this leaf is green; hence it is pleasant." "The sensuous is neither good nor bad; but man is a sensuous being; hence he is neither good nor bad." "Bravery is a virtue; Alexander possessed bravery; hence he was virtuous." "Drunkenness is a vice; Alexander was addicted to drunkenness; hence he was vicious," &c.)

§ 43. According to form, the two premises are immediate relations. The form of the syllogism contains, however, the demand that they should be mediated, or according to the common expression, the premises should be proved. But the proof through this form of the syllogism would be only a repetition of it, and thus the same demand would recur again *ad infinitum*.

§ 44. The mediation—and hence the Particularity and Universality must therefore be brought in through the moment of Individuality. This gives the second form of the syllogism: U—I—P. This syllogism is correct, in the first place, only in so far as the judgment U—I has validity. In order that this may be the case, U must be Particular. In this case, the Individual is not really the middle term. The syllogism is brought back to the form of the first, but the conclusion is particular. This syllogism has however, in general, the signification (in contradistinction to the other), that immediate determinations or qualities are connected through individuality, and in so far contingently.

§ 45. The Individual connected with the Particular through the Universal gives the third form of the syllogism: P—U—I. The Universal is here the mediating determination and predicate in both premises. But it does not follow that two determinations are the same because they inhere in the same in-

dividual; it follows rather that the two determinations are subsumed under the same Universal, and not that they can be united as subject and predicate. Only in so far as the major premise is *negative*, and thus can be inverted, does this syllogism admit of reduction to the first and consequently possess the correct form. ("No finite Being is holy; God is no finite Being; hence God is holy.")

§ 46. The objective signification of this syllogism is that the union of particularity with individuality has its ground alone in the identical nature of the two.

§ 47. (1) In this series of syllogisms each of the three determinations has in succession constituted the middle term. The reduction of the second and third syllogistic forms is the cancelling of the *qualitative*. (2) Although each immediate relation of the first syllogism is mediated through the succeeding one, yet each of the latter presupposes the preceding one, i. e. the mediated unity presupposes the immediate identity.

Note by Translator. — The qualitative Syllogism is realized in all finite existences: in them, only a phase of the totality exists at one time. They belong to Time and Space for the very reason that they (1) are spread out in space, i. e. sundered into self-externality, and (2) are changeable, i. e. their Total is only in part real, and for the most part only potential. No thing would change did other potentialities not exist for it. Since the qualitative Syllogism is the form in which the Universal = Total or Comprehension is realized (i. e. becomes individual) in only one of its particularities (potentialities), it follows that this is the Syllogism of Finitude and perpetual change.

The finite side of life takes this form; e. g. one fashion follows another: some special defect or inconvenience being discovered in the former, a new one is adopted with special reference to correcting it; the latter being a mere particular is defective in some *other* respect, and has in turn to give way.

That "Truth is the correspondence of an object with the Comprehension" (§ 66), is easy to see from this point of view. The Comprehension being the Totality, if an object is in anywise defective it will be because part of its determinations are merely *potential* and not *actual*. Alkali is deficient for the reason that its proximate Comprehension is its union with acid in the form of salt. No Being has truth except as a Total or as adequate to its Comprehension; out of this it is changeable and perishable.

B.—Syllogisms of Quantity or Reflection.

§ 48. The immediate non-qualitative [quantitative] syllogism is the *mathematical* one. The middle term of this syllogism is only such a somewhat as is *equal* to the two others. As proposition it is expressed thus: If two magnitudes are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.

§ 49. Secondly, in the quantitative syllogism, Individuality, not as *one* individual, but as *all* individuals, constitutes the middle term. In so far as some one quality belongs to all, this quality is expressed as quality of that universal sphere or of the *genus* itself to which the individuals belong. This is the syllogism of *Induction*.

§ 50. The syllogism in which the Universal is the middle term, infers through *analogy* that, in the case of two subjects which are the same according to their general determinations, a particular determinateness which belongs to one, also belongs to the other.

(a. Several individuals have a common nature ;

b. One of the individuals has a certain quality ;

c. Therefore the other individuals have this quality.)

(In the case of Induction, the question arises what ought to be the subject or predicate in the conclusion ; e. g. "What moves itself with freedom is an animal", or, "An animal is what moves itself with freedom." "The lion is a mammal", or, "What a mammal is, is a lion." In the case of Analogy, on the contrary, the mediation lies in the fact that another individual has the same common nature. While in the case of Induction the particular determinateness of the common nature is grounded in the individual, Analogy infers from the common nature the particular determinateness of the Individual ; e. g. Jupiter and the Earth are planets ; the Earth has inhabitants ; therefore Jupiter has inhabitants.)

C.—Syllogisms of Relation.

§ 51. The *categorical* syllogism has for middle term the in-and-for-itself-existing Universality or the nature of the individual subject, of which, as such, an essential property is expressed and is connected to this subject.

§ 52. The *hypothetical* syllogism expresses another Being as the ground of some particular Being. If A is, then B is : but A is ; therefore B is. The determinations are no longer in relation as Individual, Particular, and Universal, but a determination, B, which in the first place is only in-itself-existent, or potential, is connected with existence through A as middle term, which is existent as well as ground.

§ 53. In the *disjunctive* syllogism, the ground that a determination is connected with a subject consists in this, that

one part of the particular determinations of a total sphere do not belong to it, and consequently the rest do belong to it; or, *vice versa*. A is either B, C, or D: but it is not B nor C; therefore it is D.

§ 54. The middle term is therefore the subject as a total (universal) sphere in its complete particularization, and contains at the same time the excluding or positing of a part of these its determinations. The subject is as a Universal [totality] in itself the potentiality of several determinations. From its Universality [Totality] or Potentiality a transition is to be made to its determinateness or actuality.

§ 55. A survey of the forms of the syllogism adduces the fact that: (1) in the *qualitative* syllogisms the moments have validity only in their qualitative difference. They need therefore a mediating link, but this falls outside of them, and is their immediate unity. (2) In the *quantitative* syllogisms, the qualitative difference of moments is suppressed, and with it the mutual relation and distinction of mediate from immediate are obliterated. (3) In the syllogisms of Relation, the mediation contains at the same time immediateness. Therefore from this the comprehension of an immediateness of Nature or of qualitative difference has made its appearance, which at the same time is mediation in-and-for-itself; and this is FINAL CAUSE and PROCESS.

Note by Translator.—The syllogisms are, therefore,

A. Syllogisms of Inherence:

- a. $I-P-U$;
- b. $U-I-P$, or $P-I-U$;
- c. $P-U-I$.

B. Syllogisms of Reflection:

- a. $A-A-A$, or $I-I-I$: *the mathematical*.
- b. $U-i+i+i+i+\&c.-P$: *the inductive*.
- c. $I-U-P$: *the analogical*.

C. Syllogisms of Relation or Necessity:

- a. *Categorical*;
- b. *Hypothetical*;
- c. *Disjunctive*.

The movement (or dialectic) of the syllogism consists in mediating each term so that in the higher forms each (term) becomes a complete realization of the Comprehension (or Totality); major and minor premises and conclusion—each becomes a complete syllogism in itself. With this the transition is made to the “Realization of the Comprehension,” i. e. to its complete existence, which has three stages of perfection: (1) Mechanical, (2) Chemical, (3) Teleological. In the Teleological, a transition is found to the Idea. (See note on § 47, *sub finem*.) Truth = the Idea = Reality (or Objectivity) which exists as a complete systematic Totality = Spirit.

Second Division.

THE REALIZATION OF THE COMPREHENSION.

§ 56. In the Judgment as well as in the Syllogism, the Comprehension is in immediate reality, i. e. in the indifferent existence of the subject and predicate; or the extremes of the syllogism are opposed to each other and to the middle term. The OBJECTIVE consists in this: that these moments become in themselves the whole, so that their Immediateness is precisely this, to be the whole.

§ 57. In the Final Cause, that which is inference and result is at the same time the immediate active cause. It is as a subjective somewhat separated from the external Being which is extant, and the activity consists in the translation of the subjective form into objectivity. In this transition the final cause returns into its comprehension.

§ 58. The syllogism of the activity which is in conformity with design (teleological activity) has three moments: the subjective purpose, the mediation, and the existent (realized) design. Each of these moments is the Totality of all the determinations of the syllogism.

§ 59. (1) The subjective purpose contains: (a) the undetermined *free activity* of a subject in general, which (b) determines itself or particularizes its universality and gives itself a determined content; (c) it has the moment of individuality, according to which it is negative toward itself, cancels the subjective, and produces an external existence independent of the subject.

§ 60. (2) The mediation or the transition into objectivity has two sides in it: (a) that of objectivity—this is an external thing as means, which, through the power of the subject, becomes a *means*, and is turned against external Being; (b) the side of subjectivity is the mediating activity, which on the one hand brings the means into relation to the purpose (design) and subordinates it thereto, and on the other hand turns it against the objective, and through the cancelling of the determinations of the External gives reality to the purpose (or design).

§ 61. (3) The realized purpose (or design) is: (a) Being of the objectivity in general, (b) not however a mere immediate

Being but a posited and mediated one, and (c) of the same content as the subjective purpose (or design).

§ 62. The defect of this teleological relation is the immediate existence of each of the three moments which enter into mutual relation, for which therefore the relation and the determinations which those moments receive in it are externally brought together. The entire movement of this realization of the Comprehension is therefore, in general, a subjective affair. As objective, the realization is the process as internal relation of the moments of the syllogism according to their peculiar nature. In the process actual objects stand in relation as independent extremes, whose internal determination is however that which causes it to be through the mediation of others and to be in union with them.

§ 63. (1) In the sphere of *Mechanism* objects are united or changed by a third force, so that this union or change does not lie already determined in their nature beforehand, but is external or contingent to them, and they remain consequently in it independent of each other.

§ 64. (2) In the sphere of *Chemism* [the Chemical] each of the two extremes is: (a) according to its particular Being, a Determinate and at the same time essentially opposite to the other; (b) as in opposition, *in itself* a relation to the other. It is not only itself, but it has the peculiarity to exist only in union with the other, or its nature is in itself a tension and active against the other; (c) the unity of the extremes is the neutral product which constitutes the ground of its relation and of its entrance into the process, but this unity is extant in them only as in-itself-existent (potential) relation. It exists not free for itself anterior to the process. This is the case in Teleology.

§ 65. (3) The higher unity is therefore: that the activity preserves itself in the product, or that the product is self-producing, and consequently that the neutralizing of the moments is likewise their diremption, or that the quenching of the process in the union of the extremes is at the same time the rekindling of the process. The activity of this productive product is consequently self-preservation. It only reproduces itself and yet is itself already existent.

Third Division.

SCIENCE OF THE IDEA.

§ 66. The Idea is the objective True or the adequate Comprehension in which particular Being is determined through its immanent comprehension, and in which Existence, as self-producing product, is in external unity with its final cause. The Idea is, not that actuality which corresponds to some external notion or other which is already extant, but that which corresponds to its own comprehension; which, therefore, is in such a form as it ought to be in-and-for-itself, and contains this its comprehension itself. The "*ideal*" is the Idea considered on the side of *Existence*, but as such a somewhat as is in conformity with the Comprehension. It is therefore the Actual in its highest truth. In contradistinction to the expression *Ideal*, one would call *Idea* rather the True considered from the side of the Comprehension.

§ 67. There are three ideas: (1) The Idea of *Life*; (2) The Idea of Cognition and of the Good; and (3) The Idea of Science or of Truth itself.

I.—*Idea of Life.*

§ 68. Life is the Idea in its immediate determinate Being, through which it enters the field of Phenomena or of changeable Being, and stands in opposition to inorganic nature and manifoldly and externally determined Being.

§ 69. Life is as immediate unity of the Comprehension and of extant Being, such a whole as contains the parts not for themselves, but through the whole and in the whole, and the whole is just as much through the parts. It is an organic system.

II.—*Idea of Cognition and of the Good.*

§ 70. In this Idea the comprehension and actuality fall asunder. The former (the comprehension), on the one hand, empty by itself, is to receive its determination and filling up from the Actuality; on the other hand, the latter should receive its determination from the independent determination of the former.

(1) Cognition.

§ 71. Cognition is the relation of the comprehension and

actuality. The thinking which concerns only itself, and is in so far empty, becomes replete with a particular content, through this relation, and the particular content is thus elevated from Being to universality (universal exhibition of it).

§ 72. The *definition* expresses of an object which stands in relation to it as an individual or a particular, its *genus* as its general essence, and the particular determinateness thereof through which it is *this* object.

§ 73. The *classification* expresses of a *genus* or Universal in general, a race, or an order, &c., the *particulars* in which it as a manifoldness of species exists. These particulars which are contained in a unity, must flow from a common ground of division.

§ 74. Cognition is partly *analytical*, partly *synthetical*.

§ 75. The *analytical* cognition proceeds from a comprehension or a concrete determination, and, develops only the manifoldness of the immediate or identical simple determinations which are therein contained.

§ 76. The *synthetical* cognition develops, on the contrary, the determinations of a Whole which are not contained in it immediately, and do not flow from each other by the principle of identity, but have the form of difference towards each other, and it (synthesis) shows the necessity of their determined relation to each other.

§ 77. This happens through *Construction* and *Proof*. Construction exhibits the comprehension or proposition, partly in its real determinations, partly in behalf of the proof it exhibits this its reality in its division and dissolution through which its transition into the comprehension begins.

§ 78. The *Proof* seizes the dissolved parts, and produces through comparison of their relations to each other that union of the same which constitutes the expressed relation of the whole in the *Theorem*; or it shows how the real determinations are moments of the Comprehension, and exhibits in their mutual relation the Comprehension in its totality.

§ 79. In this cognition, which in its strictest form is the geometrical, (1) the construction does not proceed from the comprehension, but is a contrivance that has been discovered which shows itself to be adopted with special reference to the proof; in other cases, it is only an empirical description. (2)

In the [synthetical or mathematical] proof, instead of analytical determinations otherwise well-known or settled, synthetical propositions are brought in from outside and the subject-matter under consideration subsumed or united under them. The proof receives through this the appearance of contingency, since it exhibits necessity merely for the insight, not the internal necessity of the object itself and its own process.

(2) The "Thou Shalt" or the Good.

§ 80. In the Idea of cognition the Comprehension is sought, and it ought to be adequate to the object. In the Idea of the Good conversely, the comprehension passes for that which has the first importance and as the in-itself-existing final cause, which *ought to be* realized in the Actuality.

§ 81. The in-itself-Good, since it has yet first to be realized, stands in opposition to a world and nature which does not correspond to it, and which has its own laws that are under necessity, and is therefore indifferent to the laws of freedom.

§ 82. The Good is as absolute final cause, on the one hand, in itself to be carried out without any regard to consequences, since it has an actuality committed to its charge which is independent of it, and may utterly thwart it.

§ 83. At the same time, however, it is implied that the actuality in its true nature harmonizes with the Good; or there is a faith in a moral order of the world.

III.—*Idea of Scientific Knowledge, or Truth.*

§ 84. The absolute Knowing is the comprehension which has itself for object and content, and consequently is its own reality.

§ 85. The course or the *method* of the Absolute Knowing is both analytical and synthetical. The development of that which is contained in the comprehension—analysis—is the evolution of different determinations which are contained in the comprehension, *but are not as such immediately given*, and for this reason the procedure is at the same time synthetical. The exposition of the comprehension in its real determinations proceeds from the comprehension itself, and that which constitutes the proof in the ordinary cognition is here the return into unity on the part of the moments of the compre-

hension out of the diversity into which they have gone ; this result is therefore *Totality*—a comprehension which has become replete and a content to itself.

§ 86. This mediation of the comprehension with itself is not only a course of subjective cognition, but likewise the internal movement of the object itself. In the absolute cognition, the comprehension forms the *beginning*, and is also the *result*.

§ 87. The progress to further comprehensions, or to a new sphere, is likewise pointed out as necessary through what has preceded. The comprehension which became reality is at the same time again become a unity which must exhibit the movement of the realization in itself. But the development of the antithesis contained in it is not a mere dissolution into the moments from whence it has originated, but these moments have now another form through the fact that they have gone through the unity. In the new development, they are now posited as that which they are, through their relation to each other. They have received, consequently, a new determination.

APPENDIX.

[*Note by Translator.*—The following passages are translated from the Complete Logic of Hegel, and inserted here for the purpose of setting forth more clearly the position and significance of the Idea as Hegel conceives it.]

(Vol. V. Complete Works, p. 317 of 2d ed.)

“The Absolute Idea, as it has here been developed, is the identity of the Theoretical and Practical—each of these sides being inadequate by itself for the reason that the Idea is in those spheres only an unattainable Ideal which hovers before the seeker. The Theoretical and Practical Ideas [i. e. of Cognition and the Good] are each a synthesis of endeavor—of an eternal striving which realizes the Idea only partially ; each is a continual transition into the other [from the Practical to Theoretical and from Theoretical to Practical] ; but since neither side can unite both in one, they remain standing in contradiction. The Absolute Idea as the Rational Comprehension which, in its reality, encounters only itself, is on account of this immediateness of identity with the Objective, on the one hand, a recurrence of the sphere of LIFE. [The *first* sphere of the Idea is Life. But the Absolute Idea, too, possesses the Immediateness of Life, but Life in a higher sense than in Nature ; it is, in fact, Divine Life, as Hegel goes on to

say.] But it has also cancelled this form of its immediateness and contains in itself the highest antithesis. The Comprehension here is not merely SOUL, but FREE SUBJECTIVE Comprehension, which exists for itself and possesses PERSONALITY—the *practical*, in-and-for-itself-determined, objective Comprehension, which as PERSON is impenetrable atomic subjectivity—but which likewise [as Theoretical] is not mere all-excluding individuality, but also for-itself-existing universality or COGNITION, and as such recognizes, in its object, itself *as* object. [The Reasonable self-consciousness is the one which recognizes in the world the supreme might thereof as Reason, and hence sees everywhere the Becoming of Reason, or—in the language of Theology—‘God in his manifestation as Creator—as maker of his Image.’] All else [than the Absolute Idea] is error, darkness, opinion, striving, arbitrariness, and perishableness; the Absolute Idea alone is Being, everlasting Life, self-knowing Truth, and is All Truth.”

(Again, p. 339:)

“The Richest [result of scientific procedure] is therefore the concretest and most subjective; and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth, the mightiest and most comprehensive.

“*The highest, steepest summit is the PURE PERSONALITY, which alone, through the absolute dialectic forming its nature, INCLUDES AND HOLDS ALL IN ITSELF, for the reason that it elevates itself to FREEDOM—to that simplicity which is the primitive* [i. e. ‘from Eternity’] *Immediateness*, [i. e. Being which is not involved with others] *and Universality* [i. e. it is simple self-consciousness; as Hegel expresses it in the Encyclopædia, Vol. I., § 236 (Vol. VI. Complete Works, 2d ed.): ‘This (i. e. the Absolute Idea) is the νόσις νοήσεως which Aristotle characterized as the highest form of the Idea.’]

[For a conclusion to this translation, the following passage from Erdmann's *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Vol. II. p. 599) is offered as a neat statement of the content and relation of the whole Logic:]

“The categories treated in Logic are the general rational relations, which, because they rule every rational system, are called souls of all actuality, but, because they are everywhere the equally ruling laws, and are not affected by the distinctions of Nature from Spirit, they are abstractions, so that Logic leads into a shadow realm.”

“The entrance into it is necessary for the reason that the problem of all science, i. e. to recognize Reason in the different spheres, can be solved only when one knows, first, *what* Reason is, and, secondly, *how* to find it. Both these things, and,

only these. Logic teaches—the former through the perfect determination of the Comprehensions of Reason, and the latter through its being a science of Method. Hence Logic is *Philosophia Prima*, the true one. Hegel's definition of Logic—it is the science of the Idea in the abstract elements of Thinking asserts that it considers the Truth (not merely its abstract form) but how it shapes itself in abstract thought—hence not as intuited (Nature) nor as self-conscious (Spirit). With the word *Begriff*, which he takes in the wide sense that he gives to it as title of the third part, he means: *the internal self-active nature, or the essence which impels itself into Being; hence that which he calls also SUBJECT or SUBJECTIVITY.*"

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

By E. VON HARTMANN.

[The following article, sent to this Journal by Dr. Hartmann of Berlin, gives a compendious view of the position taken by that Professor in a series of treatises—some published as articles in the (Berlin) *Philosophische Monatshefte*; others as books: *Ueber die dialektische Methode*, and *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. We have in hand a short article on the latter named book, prepared for this Journal by Dr. Ernst Kapp of Düsseldorf, which we propose to give our readers in the next number. Differing as widely as we do from some of the views expressed in the following article, we cannot but venture our opinion that Goethe's apostrophe to America,

"Du hast es besser
Als unser Continent,"

applies with force to our conceptions of the systems of Philosophers. For we are obliged to gain our knowledge of such systems from the original works themselves, whereas in Germany the student hears and adopts from the mouth of the professor the traditional version of those doctrines. Otherwise it is unaccountable to us how any one can read Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* and *Philosophie der Geschichte*, and still suppose him to neglect the Will as real principle. But against that traditional Hegelianism we must concede that Schopenhauer is a most excellent prophylactic, and that Professor Von Hartmann has undertaken a valuable labor.—We are indebted to Mr. Davidson for the translation from the German original.—EDITOR.]

In Spinoza's monism, and Leibnitz's Monadology, idealism and realism are still undifferentiated; they have not yet been separated or recognized in their antithesis by the consciousness. If the Anglo-French philosophy isolated and developed realism, the side of idealism fell mainly into the hands of German philosophy. However, in order to raise idealism, which lies much farther from the common understanding than realism, to a complete system, three steps were